A Son of the Rock

BCA, 1984, 366 p.

This is an overview of the Normandy campaign from its planning through D-Day itself and on to the breakout from the beachheads to the closing of the Falaise pocket. The author’s stance on the campaign is that the Germans had the better resolve, equipment and better trained soldiers, but the Allies an overwhelming superiority in matériel and supplies. Not that that necessarily meant victory was a foregone conclusion. Much hard fighting was required. Casualty rates – on both sides – were prodigious, in some units 100%.

After the landings there was a belief among the Allies that firepower alone would suffice to beat the Germans but events proved this to be misplaced and progress did not depend on leadership. Hastings says that “few American infantry units arrived in Normandy with a grasp of basic tactics,” though their airborne troops did. There were some less than effective commanders but replacing them tended to have little effect. Even the better generals (Patton included) could not improve the performance of poor quality divisions. Problems – in both Allied armies – often lay at regimental and battalion level. German soldiers, however, adapted at once to the need for infiltration in the bocage, “their junior leadership was much superior to that of the Americans, perhaps also to that of the British.” Hastings does note that Bradley’s response to the Mortain counter-attack was, being calm and unflustered, a better command achievement than Patton’s haring around north-western France.

One thing I hadn’t realised till reading this was that even in the run-up to D-Day both Allied Air Forces were still reluctant to carry out the softening up bombing required in Northern France as they were of the opinion that they could win the war by themselves by attacking German industry and so no ground invasion would be required. Quite how this belief held on is odd since it ought to have been obvious that the German bombing Blitz on British cities had not greatly damaged the morale of the British people. Certainly not so far as to make the Government sue for peace with Germany. However, the bombing campaign over Germany in early 1944, while not really limiting aircraft production, had led to the defeat of the Luftwaffe due to the Mustang P-51 fighter’s effectiveness in inflicting losses on the Germans, whose aeroplanes and more crucially pilots consequently were not available to contest control of the skies over the invasion force. Another contributor was the Allies’ denial to the Germans of weather recording stations in the North Atlantic so hampering their forecasting. And of course there was FORTITUDE, the deception plan which had many Germans believing the Normandy invasion was a feint and another attack would take place on the Pas de Calais. As a result the Germans were unprepared for the attack when it came. Rommel of course was famously at home for his wife’s birthday and Hastings seems so tickled by the tit-bit that the German general Feuchtinger was apparently closeted away with a female friend on the night of June 5^th – 6^th that he tells us this twice.

Since the area round Caen was the hinge of the Allied force (and closest to Germany if a breakout were to take place) the Germans of course sent their best forces there. This meant the British and Canadians always faced the cream of the German troops in Normandy. The pressure was nevertheless such that Rommel was forced to use his tanks to shore up his defensive line and consequently could not concentrate them for a counter-attack. Montgomery was always conscious that British manpower was limited and the need to minimise losses resulted in overuse of what the Allies had a lot of – armour – as against a mix of armour and infantry. However, he did his reputation no good by continually misrepresenting the situation and his intentions both at the time and afterwards. In the end it was massed fire-power, particularly artillery, which wore down the Germans. In this context it is noteworthy that the historian Basil Liddell Hart later said that OVERLORD was “An operation that went according to plan but not according to timetable.”

Pedant’s corner:- focussed (many times: focused,) ditto “focussing” (focusing.) “One of the greatest throngs of commanders ever assembled … were gathered” (One … was gathered,) “Canaris’ loyalties” (Canaris’s,) “Brigadier Williams’ worst fears” (Williams’s,) “reached a crescendo” (reached a climax,) “the infantry were deployed” (was deployed,) “less weapons” (fewer weapons,) “Sepp Dietrich’s I SS Panzer Corps were quite unable” (was quite unable,) “the sheer enormity of the forces” (not enormity, they were not monstrous except in so far as any army is; ‘extent’.) “The SS were increasingly obsessed” (this is the SS as a whole, therefore ‘The SS was’,) Hodges’ (Hodges’s.)