This week’s entry for Judith’s meme from Reader in the Wilderness now hosted by Katrina at Pining for the West.

This is the top shelf of the bookcase I featured on 26/7/20.

A lot of these are from Pan’s ‘British Battles’ series, spanning a chronology from The Spanish Armada to Arnhem, but also there are The Price of Glory and To Lose a Battle from Alastair Horne’s trilogy about Franco-German hostilities between 1870 and 1945. (His The Fall of Paris is on the shelf below.) Here too you’ll find Thomas Pakenham’s The Year of Liberty and Desmond Young’s Rommel.

The British Army in the Second World War.

Sceptre, 1983, 431 p, plus ii p Contents, iii p Author’s Preface, i p Acnowledgements, i p List of maps.

The essence of this book is that it was written by a military historian who was an army man. It leans more towards a reader who has a similar background than to a wider readership.

Fraser starts on November 11^th, 1918, at the end of a previous war for which the British Army had been totally unprepared (at least in terms of numbers of men) when it broke out. Yet by the Armistice the Army had turned itself into the best in the world at that time, surpassing even the Germans, who still remained formidable opponents until the last shots were fired. But during the peace all that expertise was lost, the military lessons of the Great War forgotten, and the Army became a kind of Cinderella organisation, unloved, underfunded, underequipped, and – crucially – undertrained. (That there were understandable reasons for this in a lack of public willingness to contemplate the horrors of war again so soon after what was such a massive disruption affecting so many, not to mention a political realm not keen to go against the prevailing mood, Fraser seems to discount.) It should be noted, though, that in Germany and Japan no such considerations obtained.

Seen in that context, however, the defeats the British Army endured in all theatres of war in World War 2’s early stages are not at all surprising. The mild alarm the Germans experienced at Arras in 1940, the triumphs in Somalia and Abyssinia and at Beda Fomm against the Italians (far from the fight-shy caricature of British popular myth,) speak well of the Army’s efforts to overcome its disadvantages, as does the initial victory over Rommel of Operation Crusader in the Western Desert before that instinctive military gambler turned things round again and pushed the Desert Army all the way back to El Alamein. Yet here Rommel was stopped – and could not force a way through. The less said about Malaya the better, a catalogue of bad administration, bad decisions and faulty deployments.

The book’s subtitle is The British Army in the Second World War and deals exclusively with what was called the British Army yet brought out the curious fact that for four years between mid-1940 and mid-1944 very few actual British soldiers fought the Germans or Japanese. The campaigns in Greece, Crete, the Western Desert and subsequently Italy were conducted mainly by Australian, New Zealand, South African but above all Indian, Divisions. While there were some British and Australian soldiers involved this last is especially true, with the addition of Burmese troops, of the war against the Japanese in the Far East.

The book is relentlessly focused on the military aspects of the war – wider strategic or political considerations are totally absent – and suffused with the usual military jargon and alphabet soup of Corps, Divisions, Brigades etc. If a little too concentrated on the war’s early phases, as an overview of the “British” Army from 1939-1945 it serves well.

Aside:-
In the Author’s Preface he says, “the taking of Rangoon redeemed Singapore, as Dunkirk was avenged by the crossing of the Rhine.” This may be true in a purely military sense (the sight of a Japanese army streaming back in defeat in dribs and drabs through the jungles of Burma represented an undoubted victory over notoriously tenacious opponents) but politically, strategically, and in terms of prestige nothing could redeem Singapore. Its fall in 1941 signalled the end of Britain as a world power – and the end of Empire – even if that was not fully confirmed until the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Pedant’s corner:- “against one of the most efficient and competently led war machines that have ever taken the field” (that has ever taken the field,) “the raiding party parachuted in, achieved their objective” (its objective.) “Men began to believe, in Britain, that the ultimate challenge was not going to be thrown down after all – that England would not be trod by the foot of the invader.” (England? In a narrow sense I suppose so, but it is still irritating,) “while the Italian were well furnished with pack companies” (Italians,) “a large number of anti-tank guns were deployed” (a large number of anti-tank guns was deployed,) lefthand (left hand,) Corps’ (this varied with Corps’s throughout the book, though the former usually prevailed,) “the whole of 11^th Division were behind the Perak River” (the whole was behind.) “This was the route the enemy were to take” (the route the enemy was to take,) “in the most important equipments” (equipments? Normal usage sees “equipment” as encompassing plural items,) “armed with 75mm gun” (with a 75 mm gun.) “A number of small German counter-attacks were defeated” (strictly; a number was,) Scoones’ (Scoones’s,) “the British Army’s contribution to the great adventure – thirteen divisions – were being blooded for the first time,” (the British Army’s contribution to the great adventure – thirteen divisions – was being blooded,) Horrocks’ (Horrocks’s.) “Facing Second Army, as far as was known, were a hotchpotch of” (was a hotchpotch,) “25^th Division were only secure at Kangaw” (25^th Division was only secure at Kangaw.)

British Generalship in the lean years 1939-1942. Faber and Faber, 1964, 184 p.

The book is primarily a defence of the British generals in the early years of World War 2 who, “out-numbered, out-gunned, out-tanked and inadequately supported from the air,” nevertheless did not suffer terminal defeat and thereby bought time for sufficient numbers of men, training and decent equipment to be brought to bear. (Time too for allies belatedly to alleviate the burden.)

Barclay’s preface is at pains to point out that, “with the exception of the Great War, the British Army was a small colonial force, unsuitable for modern war. Both World Wars were begun with negligible land forces which had to hold the fort until expansion had taken place. After Dunkirk, alone, defeats were inevitable, not losing the war was about all that could be done,” and include the amazing statistic that, “The Boer War of 1899-1902 cost us more in men and material resources than the struggle against Napoleon nearly one hundred years before.” Perhaps more contentiously he states that, “the Staff College provided us in World War 2 with the best team of generals this country has ever known.” A particular handicap was that British generals’ experience of armoured warfare when the war began was theoretical as none had directed armoured troops as those forces barely exisedt. Nevertheless an armoured foray against the German advance near Arras did give the enemy cause for concern.

Barclay devotes one chapter each to Gort, Wavell, O’Connor, Wilson, Auchinleck, Cunningham, Percival and Hutton. Gort made the correct decision to retreat to Dunkirk and thereby saved not only most of the BEF, including most of the generals who would go on to victory in the latter years of the war, but also a substantial number of French troops, Wavell oversaw the victories against the Italians in East and North Africa, O’Connor directed that North African campaign and might have gone on to Tripoli if not denuded of troops for the forlorn Greek adventure but was then unluckily captured by a German patrol, Wilson helped in the planning for O’Connor’s victory and was then himself plunged into the debacle that was Greece before taking successful command of the Iraq, Syria and Persia sector, Auchinleck at least stopped Rommel’s first foray into Egypt but as an Indian Army man with no experience of armoured warfare was a strange choice for the role given to him, Cunningham swept the Italians from East Africa before being (briefly and almost certainly mistakenly) appointed to command in the Western Desert, Percival made no difference at all to the defence of Malaya and Singapore and Hutton had the impossible job of trying to save Rangoon.

While Norway, the Dunkirk campaign, the Western Desert, Greece, Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma saw defeats they were in the main retrievable. The single utter catastrophe was the fall of Malaya and Singapore (the biggest ever defeat in British military history.) This could be put down to political failure, local attitudes and dispositional necessities but General Percival did not do much to ginger things up when he arrived. It was also the only British campaign for hundreds of years in which naval support was totally absent. This was of course due to the sinkings of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse by the Japanese air force. In amongst these setbacks there were notable successes, the utter destruction of numerically much larger Italian forces in East Africa and North Africa (“two of the most resounding military victories in history”,) the elimination of the Vichy French threat in Syria and the flawed success of Operation Crusader in the Western Desert.

Barclay cites lack of high quality training as a principal contributor to defeat. Better trained, more mobile forces, even if much smaller in number, can nevertheless achieve victory. Against the Italians the British troops (whom I would submit were also better motivated) were the better trained. In Malaya, not so, even if the Japanese had in effect only the one tactic. The Germans were, of course, trained superbly.

The book is unfortunately lacking in depth. In addition, due to the overlapping jurisdictions and swapping of roles there is frequent repetition of information. We were told about ABDA at least four times.

According to Barclay the war was disastrous in its consequences, “allowing Communism into the heart of Central Europe.” In addition the colonies were lost, Britain’s prestige and influence declined. Yet the consequences of a German and Japanese victory would have been even more regrettable. And the generals discussed did prevent that.

Barclay’s somewhat Victorian/Edwardian world-view, exemplified by the Communism remark above, is emphasised by his use of the word “savages” to describe some of the native peoples against whom the British Army was used in colonial times. Fifty years after the book’s publication reading that expression came as a shock.

Pedant’s corner:- he showed mark enthusiasm (marked,) india (India,) seemed to damp enthusiasm (dampen,) and other who visited (others,) the British public have been given the impression (has been given,) Field- Marshall (Field-Marshal,) Alemein (Alamein,) non-commital (non-committal,) Iraqui (may have been the spelling in 1964; now it is Iraqi,) based on New Delhi (in, surely?) after he arrive (arrived,) Caldron Battle (Cauldron is more usual,) there were a few (was,) for an Army office his early background (officer,) military unsound (militarily,) Japanes (Japanese,) “It would be foolish to deny that there may not have been neglect in the training of the Army in Malaya” (the exact opposite is meant; “It would be foolish to deny that there may have been neglect in the training of the Army in Malaya.” It is obvious from Barclay’s previous comments that the training was very poor,) “if other councils had prevailed” (counsels,) it maybe that (may be,) “that is is no part” (that it is,) two lines are transposed on page 160, by much small bodies (such small bodies,) to a less degree (lesser degree is more usual,) acquite (acquit,) salving the bulk of the Burma Army (saving makes more sense,) miscaste (miscast,) “the programmes for units was similarly laid down” (either

Fontana, 2012, 387p.

To anyone familiar with the film The Desert Fox, starring James Mason, the outlines of Rommel’s story will be familiar. The movie, though based on this book – the author even plays himself in the film – concentrates less on Rommel’s military career than his last days; with Rommel’s unwitting contacts with the July plotters leading to his forced suicide.

This biography, written after contact with Rommel’s family and first published in 1950, inevitably tends to be admiring. The author’s personal experience of Rommel’s conduct towards him as a PoW helps in this regard and there were no accusations of war crimes committed by the Afrika Korps. Winston Churchill himself regarded Rommel as a worthy opponent. Rommel’s anti-Nazi credentials are taken for granted by Young. (However recent reassessments in Germany have called this into question.)

In a military sense Rommel’s career speaks for itself. Though criticised as lacking in the strategic sense, his tactical ability, his capacity to see an opportunity and exploit it, to take risks even (especially?) when on the back foot paid off time and again. He had what the Germans call Fingerspitzengefühl, “intuition in his fingers” and a sort of sixth sense for avoiding death.

Not a typical Prussian General (he was in fact a Württemberger and liked nothing better than talking to soldiers from the locality in the thick Swabian dialect) and not from a military family, in the Great War he won the Pour le Mérite for exploits on the Italian Front where he first displayed the qualities which made his troops so willing to follow him. He was in the forefront of the German breakthroughs in the defeat of France in 1940, but his commanders and colleagues thought him too reckless and/or selfish – and too willing to take credit for wider success. Part of this may, of course, have been professional jealousy. It was the Western Desert, with its wide open spaces, that allowed him to show himself as a master of motorised/armoured warfare. He recognised that such battles were more akin to sea warfare than land and he criticised the British for their more rigid approach while acknowledging that their training for more static warfare was excellent.

I had not realised before how nearly General Auchinleck‘s Operation Crusader came to defeating Rommel completely a year earlier than Alamein. That the British/Empire forces did so well considering their inferior equipment (poorer anti-tank guns, lower quality tanks – some Grants were available at this time but Shermans not until the next year) speaks volumes for their tenacity and endeavour. Rommell eventually turned the tables but his race to Egypt seriously overstretched both his army and his supply lines.

It was his contention that reinforcement could have resulted in him capturing Egypt and the Suez Canal. Once held at Alamein, and facing a well supplied and trained opponent with overwhelming superiority, he and his staff knew the jig was up.

He was bitterly aggrieved that, in the subsequent retreat and the aftermath of Operation Torch, reinforcements were then rushed in to Tunisia in what was by the time a lost cause.

After his first inspections of it he also knew that the much vaunted Atlantic Wall was anything but impregnable yet nevertheless – even through his disillusionment with Hitler and the upper General Staff (he had inspired the enmity of Kietel and Jodl in particular) – he threw himself into efforts to improve it.

British people who lived through the Second World War have a tendency to refer to the Italian army as a byword for uselessness (making jokes about tanks with only reverse gears for example.) It is noteworthy that Rommel himself had a greater appreciation of their qualities. “The Italian soldier was willing, unselfish and a good comrade and, considering his circumstances, his achievement was far above the average.” He goes on to add that their army’s performance exceeded anything the Italian Army had done for over 100 years. He attributes any failure to their military and state system, their poor equipment and lack of interest from Italian politicians.