David and Charles, 1965, 254 p including 8 p Index, 2 p Appendix of Nelson’s Ships and Captains and 1 p Appendix Note on Sources.

As its title implies the book concentrates on the sea fights in which Horatio Nelson took part. While some details of his life outside the navy are mentioned these are very much by the way as far as Warner is concerned as they did not impact on Nelson’s conduct at sea. Warner contends that it was Nelson’s victories that made the winning of the Napoleonic Wars possible. Without British sea superiority Napoleon could have threatened India or even invaded Britain. He certainly had plans to do so if the Royal Navy were to be neutralised. Though Warner does not mention it the prosecution of the Peninsular War would also have been impossible without British control of the  seas.

Nelson first made his tactical acumen known at the Battle of Cape St Vincent where he moved his ship out of the battle line without orders as he realised to do so and make direct for the nearest Spanish ships would disorganise the opponent and – somewhat paradoxically – allow his commander’s ultimate intentions to be fulfilled. To naval men the line of battle “was sacred” so this unparalleled (and never repeated) leaving of the line without a direct order was a court-martial offence and meant probable disgrace, the more so since that commander, Jervis, was an extreme disciplinarian. Two other ships joined Nelson’s move however, and Jervis received him afterwards “with the greatest affection.” (He had after all won a victory due to it.)

Nelson’s next major encounter was the Battle of the Nile (more strictly of Aboukir Bay) where he split his force in two to attack both sides of the French fleet simultaneously, not as hazardous an endeavour as it might have been since the French ships were at anchor – at least at the battle’s start – and consequently unable to manoeuvre effectively. The result was confirmed when the French flagship L’Orient blew up spectacularly.

Nelson was famously to repeat disobedience at the Battle of Copenhagen. (“I have only one eye. I have a right to be blind sometimes.”) His Commander there, Parker, fully expected Nelson to ignore his signal to break off, though, if that was the correct course. However, others in the fleet of necessity obeyed it; to their cost. In many respects – the Danish ships were at anchor, and under the cover of shore guns – this was similar to the Nile, though Nelson’s tactics were slightly changed. This time he asked his ships to line up against their counterparts one by one, starting at the fifth Danish ship, the next two going on to the Danish 6 and 7 while others took on ships 4 to 1. In this way the least supportable part of the Danish fleet could be overwhelmed before the rest of it could affect the outcome. More remarkably the time elapsing between these orders being issued and their execution was extremely short. The victory cemented Nelson’s reputation.

Trafalgar was an altogether different affair; a full sea battle, one Nelson had sought for a long time. His plan was to cut the French and Spanish line in three (in the event only two such incursions were made) by the use of columns of British ships and so ensure a pell-mell battle in which he was convinced – correctly as it turned out – he would be victorious.

The details of the sea fighting of the times are gruesome. The casualties and wounds inflicted by cannonballs and splinters from wooden hulls pierced by them horrific. There was little shelter on the gun decks and no barriers to shot barrelling through them from one end to the other if raked by a broadside. On the open deck sailors and the soldiers the ships carried were even more exposed, Nelson himself felled by a rifle shot, and his national hero status thus guaranteed.  Britain’s naval supremacy was not to be seriously challenged for over one hundred years.

Whatever the faults in his private life (mercifully little of which does this account deal with) Nelson’s effect on his subordinates – not to mention the ratings – was inspiring.

Pedant’s corner:- “the Times’” (the Times’s,) “she had not formerly declared war” (‘formally’ makes more sense,) Guadaloupe (on a map. Now spelled ‘Guadeloupe’.)

Britain’s Famous Wartime Naval Base

Birlinn, 2000, 191 p.

As its subtitle implies this is a short history of the use of Scapa Flow in Orkney as a base for British naval operations. These had marginal beginnings in the Napoleonic Wars but the emergence of Germany as a potential enemy and a threat to North Sea and Atlantic shipping during the run up to the Great War led to proposals for the main British fleet to be stationed there. The outbreak of war saw these brought to fruition and Scapa and Orkney quickly became a home to thousands of men – and in World War 2 many women, who on their nights out were apparently strictly chaperoned. The locals were also in great demand for dances and such. Unlike in the rest of the UK in wartime food was reasonably plentiful on Orkney due to its fertility. Eggs were in good supply and there was never a shortage of mutton!

The book is replete with photographs, with a readily accessible text. The caption to a photo of the men of the Ness Battery in front of a hut mentions the strap designed to hold the hut down during strong winds.

The main incidents are all here; the HMS Vanguard explosion, the loss of HMS Hampshire, the collision of HMS Opal and HMS Narborough, the internment of the German High Seas Fleet in 1918, its Grand Scuttle in 1919, the sinking of HMS Royal Oak, the building of the Churchill Barriers and the Italian Chapel. A quick, easy history of the UK naval presence in Orkney.

Pedant’s corner:- fiand (find – all five instances of this word in this book were spelled in that odd way,) Grand Fleet commander Admiral Sir George Callaghan (is referred to thereafter as Cunningham,) stripped the ships off anything of use (stripped the ships of anything of use.)